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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 20-2317
_____________
KEYLIN YOLANDA RIVERA-AMAYA;
ARNOL OBENIEL RIVERA-AMAYA a/k/a/ Arnul Obeniel Rivera-Amaya,
Petitioners
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
____________
On Petition for Review of a Decision and Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(A206-684-658; A206-684-659)
Immigration Judge: Steven A. Morley
____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 22, 2021
Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and BIBAS, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 23, 2021)
___________
OPINION *
____________

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

*

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Keylin Rivera-Amaya and her brother, Arnol (collectively, Petitioners), seek
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ final order upholding an immigration
judge’s denial of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We will dismiss the petition in part and
deny it in part.
I
Petitioners’ asylum claims arise from a 2014 incident in their hometown in
Honduras where they lived with their grandparents. While returning home late one
January evening, Keylin was abducted by a local man named Eldean. 1 Eldean took
Keylin to his house on the outskirts of town and held her overnight. The next morning,
Eldean attempted to sexually assault Keylin, but he relented when one of his relatives
intervened on Keylin’s behalf. Later that day, after Keylin’s grandparents came looking
for her at Eldean’s home, he moved her to a different location. While en route, Arnol—
who had been searching for his sister since shortly after her abduction—came across
Eldean and Keylin. Eldean released Keylin into Arnol’s care without incident. From the
time of Keylin’s abduction through her safe return to her brother, the police were not
called. Several days after the incident, Eldean gave Arnol an “evil stare,” but did not
otherwise engage him. A.R. 62.

The record is inconsistent as to the spelling of Eldean’s name. We adopt Petitioners’
spelling.
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In March 2014, Petitioners entered the United States illegally. Three days later, the
Department of Homeland Security served Petitioners with notices to appear, alleging they
were removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Petitioners filed applications for
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the regulations implementing the
CAT. In May 2018, an IJ denied Petitioners’ applications and ordered them removed to
Honduras. Two years later, the BIA issued an opinion affirming the IJ’s decision. This
timely petition for review followed.
II
We exercise jurisdiction over final removal orders under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).
Our jurisdiction is limited, however, to cases where a petitioner “has exhausted all
administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); see also
Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 594–95 (3d Cir. 2003). “Because the BIA did
not summarily affirm the IJ’s order but instead issued a separate opinion, we review the
BIA’s disposition and look to the IJ’s ruling only insofar as the BIA deferred to it.” Roye
v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2012). We review the BIA’s legal conclusions
de novo, Rranci v. Att’y Gen., 540 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2008), and its factual findings
for substantial evidence, Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att’y Gen., 781 F.3d 677, 684 n.5 (3d Cir.
2015).
III
A
To be eligible for asylum, Petitioners must demonstrate refugee status by showing
they are “unable or unwilling to return” to Honduras “because of persecution or a well3

founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
Before the IJ and the BIA, Keylin claimed she was persecuted on account of her
membership in a particular social group: “members of a family unit headed by a single
woman.” A.R. 3; accord A.R. 67. On appeal, Keylin does not challenge the IJ’s and
BIA’s determinations that she was not a member of her proposed social group. 2 Instead,
she now defines her social group as “young Honduran woman.” Amaya Br. 13; accord
Amaya Br. 3–4, 8, 14, 19. Because Keylin did not raise this social group before the IJ or
BIA, we lack jurisdiction to consider it now. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); accord Castro v.
Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 356, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) (“A petitioner’s failure to exhaust an issue
by presenting it to the BIA deprives us of jurisdiction to consider that issue.”).
Arnol’s proposed social group—“members of his sister’s family”—also fails. A.R.
3. For a family to qualify as a particular social group, there must be evidence of
immutability, particularity, and social distinction. Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581,
588 (A.G. 2019) (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014)).
Arnol has failed to produce such evidence, so his asylum claim fails for want of a social
group.
B

Both the IJ and the BIA noted that Keylin—who lived with her grandparents—was not
a member of a family headed by a single woman.
2
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Petitioners’ claims for withholding of removal likewise fail. Because the standard
for withholding of removal is higher than that for asylum, their failure to qualify for
asylum renders them “necessarily ineligible for withholding of removal.” S.E.R.L. v. Att’y
Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 544 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663
F.3d 582, 591 (3d Cir. 2011)).
C
Petitioners’ claims for protection under the CAT are also unavailing. We agree
with the BIA that Petitioners failed to establish “that it is more likely than not that they
would be tortured if removed” to Honduras. Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 151 (3d Cir.
2005) (cleaned up). Keylin’s abuser (Eldean) is not a government official. Nor is there
evidence that government officials would instigate, consent to, or acquiesce in
Petitioners’ torture. See id.; see also Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 515–16 (3d Cir.
2017). So they cannot obtain relief under the CAT.
IV
For the reasons stated, we will dismiss the petition in part and deny it in part.
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